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I. RESEARCH CONTEXT
Making a computational agent ‘social’ has implications for
how it perceives itself and the environment in which it is
situated, including the ability to recognise the behaviours of
others at various levels – simple actions, goals and intentions.
Hence fundamental elements of an architecture for social
agents must allow for management of social motivations -
i.e. to reach social goals, not only practical goals - and must
model and account for actions having both practical and social
effects. Further it has been argued that to build social agents it
is not sufficient to just add a few ‘social modules’ to existing
architectures: while multilayer computational cognitive models
have been studied for some time, c.f. [1], a new layered
deliberation architecture is required that at the higher level(s)
naturally accommodates analysis of decision choices that
take into account both rich context and future projections of
possible consequences, yet does not rely on computational
expensive deep reasoning capability [2], [3], [4].
In the work reported here, we do not attempt to address the
‘large’ questions associated with the design of a fully inte-
grated computational cognitive architecture; rather we adopt a
relatively narrow focus on exploiting and extending epistemic
planning mechanisms to achieve run-time generation of plans
in rich multi-actor contexts, i.e. we seek to construct social
plans in settings where the social context is relevant in the
assessment of the beliefs and capabilities of others, and in
making appropriate choices of what to do next.
Our approach has been informed by our experience with
the BDI model of agency [5] and several associated agent
architectures - architectures that were introduced to support
a balance of deliberative and reactive behaviours, and that
in their instantiation are reliant on domain-specific expert
knowledge acquisition to provide a knowledge level view [6],
c.f. [7], [8]. We are also supporters of the position that logic-
based techniques are well suited to represent social reasoning
and through which to engineer effective mechanisms, c.f. [9],
[10], [11].
Fundamental concepts we build on include: reasoning about
the beliefs of others, including their beliefs about others;
establishing common ground; and the use of stereotypes. So
a few words about each.
Exploiting mutual awareness to enable a participant engaged
in collaborative activity with others to select an appropri-
ate action typically involves Theory of Mind (ToM) reason-
ing [12], [13], i.e., reasoning about the knowledge, beliefs,
perspectives and reasoning of other participants. Agent-based
computational models have been used to investigate higher-
order ToM in varied scenarios, including alignment with
human performance data in some cases e.g., [14], [15], [16],
[17], [18], [19].
A specific element of ToM reasoning is grounding, or
establishing common ground, i.e. an important mechanism by
which participants engaged in joint activity coordinate their
respective understandings of matters at hand. This construct
arises from a model of conversation developed by Herbert
Clark [20] and since studied widely in many fields, includ-
ing social psychology, e.g. [21], HCI, e.g. [22], philosophy,
e.g. [23]. Finding computationally amenable representations
and mechanisms that allow agents interacting with humans
to keep track of the activity, and their understanding of
other participants in the same activity, remains a challenge,
c.f. [4], [24]. Exploring alternative definitions of grounding,
allowing for subtle and important variations in the notions
of knowledge, belief and acceptance, is one aspect we have
investigated [25], [26].
To efficiently take action in settings without the forms of full
information needed for ToM reasoning, humans often reason
in terms of the (reference) groups to which they and others
belong, and the role structures and stereotypical behaviours
associated with those reference groups. Steps have been taken
towards equipping agents with similar computational capabil-
ities, e.g., [27], [28], [29].
Now to social planning. Planning research has for some
time yielded highly efficient mechanisms for plan synthesis
suiting single-agent scenarios. Input to a planner includes
descriptions of the world and effects of available actions,
the initial state(s) that the world might be in before the
plan-execution agent performs any actions, and the desired
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objectives, such as achieving a goal or performing a specific
task. The output typically consists of either a plan (a sequence
of actions for the agent to perform) or a policy (an action to
perform for each state). However, such descriptions are often
insuffient for agents operating in multi-agent environments.
In such environments, a planning agent must consider that
other agents have their own actions and mental states, and
that these actions and mental states can affect the outcomes
and interpretation of its own actions. Thus, such reasoning is
inherently a social task.
In environments where an agent needs to plan its interac-
tions with others, computational complexity increases: the ac-
tions of the other agents can induce a combinatorial explosion
in the number of contingencies to be considered, making both
the search space and the solution size exponentially larger,
hence demanding novel methods. A recent advance is the
development of epistemic planning [30]: planning according
to the knowledge or belief (and iterated knowledge or belief)
of other agents, allowing the specification of a more complex
class of planning domains than those mostly concerned with
simple facts about the world.
Building on this work and on recent advances in non-
deterministic planning, we have made progress towards the
challenge of efficient reasoning both with and about the
incomplete, higher-order, and possibly incorrect beliefs of
other individuals as part of the planning process, and how we
can plan considering the actions of others. Our work involves
descriptions and demonstrations-in-use of novel mechanisms
for stereotypical and empathetic reasoning, explorations of
how this can be used as a theory of mind, and planning while
considering the actions of others [27], [31], [32], [33], [34],
[35].
II. CHALLENGE SCENARIOS
We offer three scenarios that provide challenging settings
for social planning.
SCENARIO 1
This scenario illustrates the need for complex reasoning with
others, allowing for possibly limited or faulty perceptions by
others of their environment.
Consider a self-driving car and a pedestrian each ap-
proaching an intersection. A safe plan for each is to wait
for the other to go, resulting in a stalemate. With human
participants, such encounters are generally resolved with
social cues: e.g. one signalling to the other using a nod
of the head or hand signal. In such cases, cues such as
establishing eye contact generate a common belief that
each party understands who will go first, and each party
understands that each understands this, etc. For a self-
driving car to achieve similar interactions with a pedes-
trian, it will need both sophisticated sensing technology (to
accurately recognise the nod or hand-signal) and also rich
internal computational mechanisms to interpret the signal.
However, even physical signals often require social context
for their correct interpretation. For example, a young
child’s inability to correctly assess the belief of others,
and therefore, the common belief between themselves and
a driver, mean that the driver must consider this when
planning its action, and may behave more cautiously.
SCENARIO 2
This scenario is inspired by the Wumpus Hunt and demands
agents engage in strategic and social reasoning. It has been
used to demonstrate the power of theory of mind reason-
ing [27], [31].
The lord of a castle is informed by a peasant that a
Wumpus is dwelling in a dungeon nearby. It is known
that the Wumpus can be killed by one hunter alone only if
asleep; if awake, two hunters are required. The lord then
tasks the peasant to go to fetch the White Knight, his loyal
champion, and hunt down the beast together. The White
Knight is known for being irreprehensible, trustworthy and
brave; however, the peasant does not know any knight, and
neither their looks. While looking for the White Knight, he
runs into the Black Knight and, believing him the White
Knight, tells him about the quest.
There is some additional information that needs to be taken
into account: on one hand, the knight knows how a Wumpus
can be killed by two hunters, but he is aware that a simple
peasant may get scared by the thought of confronting an
awake Wumpus. Also, the peasant can not hunt and is unable
to see whether the Wumpus is awake (he can not approach
unnoticed), but the knight can. Therefore it is not clear to him
whether the peasant can be of any help to the quest. On the
other hand, the knight is aware of the misunderstanding: he
knows that the peasant attributes to him all the good qualities
of the White Knight, so the peasant is confident that the knight
won’t put him in danger whenever possible. While on the road,
they agree on a protocol: they will enter the dungeon from two
sides, and the Knight will use a whistle to signal whether the
Wumpus is awake, then they will attack.
SCENARIO 3
A more difficult challenge problem can be found with the
multi-player board game of deception and bluff, Hattari [36].
Hattari involves a crime scene, three suspects, one victim,
and clues. The task is to guess who is the culprit, to accuse
him or to deceive the other players! Each player receives a
“suspect profile” and 5 accusation markers. Three suspect
profiles are placed upright in the center of the table, and
one profile is placed face down, next to the other three.
That is the victim of the crime. The goal is to unmask the
the culprit among the three standing suspects. The rules
of the game involve selective sharing of information, but
also manipulation of incomplete information among the
players, through passing around of pieces as players take
turns.
Although we have incorporated some of our research on
epistemic planning into a (limited) implementation of Hat-
tari [37], creation of an artificial player that could participate
meaningfully in a game where humans exploit and interpret
body language as they navigate the possibilities of bluffing
and deception seems far beyond current technologies.
III. WORKSHOP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1) Why should you use cognitive architectures - how would
they benefit your research as a theoretical framework, a
tool and/or a methodology?
Our interest is directly in the design of cognitive architec-
tures as the basis for executable strategic collaboration and
teamwork involving hybrid human-agent teams.
2) Should cognitive architectures for social interaction be
inspired and/or limited by models of human cognition?
Cognitive architectures should be inspired by models of
human cognition. Modelling the cognitive architecture after
concepts of human cognition seems to allows us to better
prepare agents for human-agent interaction. Further, while
explorations with computational models cannot directly
shed light on human cognition, c.f. [38], experiments with
computational cognitive models can contribute to analyses
of potential building blocks for mechanisms involved in
coordination in joint action, whether it be in purely human,
or human-robot interaction contexts.
3) What are the functional requirements for a cognitive ar-
chitecture to support social interaction?
Too many to enumerate here... But, as mentioned above,
a cognitive architecture should at least have components
modeling the (social) identities, social context and social
triggers and effects of actions. In short, representations
of the social reality of the partners in the interaction are
required.
4) How the requirements for social interaction would inform
your choice of the fundamental computational structures of
the architecture (e.g. symbolic, sub-symbolic, hybrid, ...)?
Computational structures should be hybrid. For low level
interactions and time constrained feedback loops, some
very efficient and robust mechanisms are needed that
seem best to be represented sub-symbolically. However, for
longer term social actions, it is necessary to have symbolic
representations in order to deliberate, on the run, about the
(social) effects of actions.
5) What is the primary outstanding challenge in developing
and/or applying cognitive architectures to social HRI sys-
tems?
Outstanding challenges include: identifying and exploiting
‘sweet spots’ in the expressivity-efficiency tradeoff in the
engineering of computational artefacts; finding an effective
(domain specific) balance between design-time knowledge
engineering and run-time learning; signalling of state (in
both directions) between human and artificial participants
in joint activity; integration of the diverse perceptual,
cognitive and social aspects in a plausibly effective system;
establishment of metrics and evaluation methods that allow
terms such as “plausibly effective” to be precisely defined
and formally demonstrated.
6) Devise a social interaction scenario that current cognitive
architectures would likely fail, and why.
The beginnings of candidate scenarios are offered above.
To provoke failure, what is needed are scenarios exhibiting
social brittleness - i.e. where the normal course of interac-
tion fails due to different expectations or assumptions as a
result of different social understandings, and a repair has
to be found.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
Even though our focus is on cognitive mechanisms as
essential components of an integrated cognitive architecture
for effective social robots, and we have some exploratory
work on human communication patterns [39], we recognise
there are many topics important in such architectures that we
do not attempt to address – spatial reasoning [40], dialogue
actions [7], multimodal inputs [41], action signalling [24], the
link between perception and action [42], [43], and comparisons
between logic-based reasoning and other approaches such as
game theory [44] and probabilistic reasoning [45] ... to name
but a few!!
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